The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by (...) Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). We charge that their studies do not establish that the folk have a concept of phenomenal consciousness in part because they compare group agents to individuals . The problem is that group agents and individuals differ in some significant ways in terms of functional organization and behavior. We propose that future experiments should establish that ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions. (shrink)

Arguing About Human Nature covers recent debates--arising from biology, philosophy, psychology, and physical anthropology--that together systematically examine what it means to be human. Thirty-five essays--several of them appearing here for the first time in print--were carefully selected to offer competing perspectives on 12 different topics related to human nature. The context and main threads of the debates are highlighted and explained by the editors in a short, clear introduction to each of the 12 topics. Authors include Louise Anthony, Patrick Bateson, (...) David Buller, John Dupre, Paul Griffiths, Sally Haslanger, Richard Lewontin, Ron Mallon, and E.O. Wilson. Contributors Rachel Cooper, Nancy Holmstrom, Kim Sterelny, and Elizabeth Cashdan provide brand new chapters in these debates. Suggested Reading lists offer curious readers new resources for exploring these debates further. A rguing About Human Nature is the first volume of its kind, designed to introduce to an interdisciplinary student audience some of the most important arguments on the subject generated by scientific research and philosophical reflection. (shrink)

This qualitative study describes the lived experience of physicians who work in communities that have experienced a public mass shooting. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seventeen physicians involved in eight separate mass casualty shooting incidents in the United States. Four major themes emerged from constant comparative analysis: The psychological toll on physicians: “I wonder if I'm broken”; the importance of and need for mass casualty shooting preparedness: “[We need to] recognize this as a public health concern and train physicians to (...) manage it”; massive media attention: “The media onslaught was unbelievable”; and commitment to advocacy for a public health approach to firearm violence: “I want to do whatever I can to prevent some of these terrible events.”. (shrink)

« Je m'en voudrais de ne pas parler ici d'un autre Canadien, ancien élève de cette maison [Petit Séminaire de Montréal], qui jette par sa science beaucoup de lustre sur notre nom dans les milieux scientifiques de l'Europe. Le P. Éphrem Longpré nous avait été révélé par M. Étienne Gilson. L'éminent professeur de philosophic médiévale en Sorbonne avait avoué ne pas connaître d'homme plus au courant de cette difficile science que le P. Éphrem ».

En novembre 2002, a eu lieu, à l'Université de Liège, une rencontre entre chercheurs d'horizons divers autour du Cap des Tempêtes de Lucien François, publié dans cette même collection. Le droit sans la justice? Aux yeux d'Augustin et de la tradition du droit naturel en général, il est impossible d'abstraire l'un de l'autre sans donner raison au fameux pirate répliquant à Alexandre le Grand : " Parce que j'opère avec un petit navire, on m'appelle brigand ; toi, parce que tu (...) opères avec une grande flotte, Empereur! ". Que répondent à cette objection les théoriciens positivistes qui séparent quant à eux droit et justice? Comment rendent-ils compte, sans la justice, de la différence entre un Etat et une troupe de brigands, une arrestation et un rapt, une extorsion et un impôt? L'un des plus réputés d'entre eux, N. Bobbio, parlait de cette question comme du " cap des Tempêtes " que ne peut éviter d'affronter tout positivisme juridique. Le cap des Tempêtes. Essai de microscopie du droit est précisément le titre que L. François, Professeur émérite à l'Université de Liège, a donné à son dernier ouvrage. Il s'agit sans doute d'une des tentatives les plus radicales pour approcher le phénomène juridique en dehors de tout présupposé moral, selon une perspective " microscopique " originale qui met le même soin à analyser une file d'attente, un racket, ou l'organisation complexe de ce que nous appelons " l'État ". Quelles sont les conséquences philosophiques de cette approche microscopique du droit? Sur quels présupposés repose-t-elle? Y a-t-il une anthropologie, voire une ontologie, qui la sous-tendent? Et in fine, est-il réellement possible de concevoir le droit en faisant abstraction de tout principe, du moins de tout horizon, de justice? (shrink)

Natasha Mitchell: This is All in the Mind on Radio National abc.net.au/rn I'm Natasha Mitchell and really this past fortnight has been hellish for Australia, the bushfires in Victoria have claimed hundreds of human lives and it's almost been impossible to comprehend the scale of the disaster. Today's show links in a small way to the debate now being waged over what, or who, causes bushfires. It's a discussion about the philosophy of intentions and their profound moral weight.

Les textes -- Tiédeur et laxisme d'Érasme -- Rigueur et sobriété de Luther -- Les prédécesseurs de Luther -- Lignes do force du débat -- Que reste t-il de nos prières et de nos efforts? -- La doctrine des deux règnes -- La liberté le traite de la liberté du chrétien de M. luther -- Serf arbitre et nouvelle théologie -- L'oeil et le regard -- L'exigence de vérité -- La justification -- Essai de résumé du Traite du serf arbitre (...) de Martin Luther. (shrink)

Édouard Glissant’s Poetics of Relation is unlikely to strike most readers as a sacred text. True, the design of the 1997 English paperback edition hints at something mysterious within. The seventeenth century map on the cover, glowing green and only partially visible from the front, disrupts the geographic orientation a map might be expected to provide. The seeming clarity of the title, author, and translator, is likewise unsettled by their placement, suspended above the surrounding white expanse. Yet this trace (...) of eeriness is easily dispelled by the physical book’s assertion of scholarly credentials. “Michigan,” the name of the university press publisher, prominent on the spine and back, also announces itself on the front cover, and the text on the back declares the book an aesthetic and political—but not sacred—project, with three blurbs praising the translator’s achievement and the author’s brilliance. The Library of Congress cataloguing information on the copyright page tells us that Poetics of Relation, Glissant’s third monograph, is first and foremost about his birthplace (Martinique--civilization, language, culture, nationalism, and literature of). Secondarily, according to the cataloguers, it is a book about the French connection (“6. Martinique—Dependency on France. 7. West Indies, French—Relations—France. 8. France—Relations—West Indies.”). Scholarly interpretations of Poetics of Relation are of course more expansive and exploratory than cataloguing’s brevity allows. Still, most who write about this strange and beautiful text focus on poetics and politics, with very few lingering over Glissant’s own claims about the importance of the sacred. (shrink)

In this paper my aim is to get clearer on what eliminative materialism actually does and does not entail. I look closely at one cluster of views that is often described as a form of eliminativism in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science and try to show that this characterization is a mistake. More specifically, I look at conceptions of eliminativism recently endorsed by writers such as Edouard Machery, Paul Griffiths, Valerie Hardcastle and others, and argue that although these views do (...) endorse the elimination of something, they offer only what I will call a sort of category dissolution, and should be treated as something altogether different from traditional eliminativism. Spelling out the main contrast between eliminative materialism proper and this alternative view, and defending the need to keep them distinct, is my primary objective. As I show, a central irony is that proponents of the problematic outlook often insist that divergent things should not be classified together under a single label. By characterizing their own views as a form of eliminativism, they commit a fundamental error that they themselves argue should not be made. While my focus here is on eliminative materialism, the error I intend to highlight appears across various discussions about alleged eliminativism of all sorts of things. (shrink)

Edouard Machery argues that many traditional philosophical questions are beyond our capacity to answer. Answering them seems to require using the method of cases, a method that involves testing answers to philosophical questions against what we think about real or imagined cases. The problem, according to Machery, is that this method has proved unreliable ; what we think about these kinds of cases is both problematically heterogeneous and volatile. His bold solution: abandon the method of cases altogether and with it (...) many of the questions that we have come to associate with philosophy itself. Many of the critical responses to Machery’s book have focused on whether empirical work on judgements about philosophical cases supports his claim that the method of cases is unreliable. Our problem with these responses is that they accept that reliability is the right way to frame empirically informed concerns about the method of cases, and we think that it is not. The reason is simple: the kind of unreliability thesis that Machery needs proves to be empirically intractable, at least by anything like the current methods used by experimental philosophers, or so we shall argue here. While we have empirical grounds for thinking that unreliability arguments don’t give us reason to abandon the method of cases, we do think that there are empirical grounds for thinking that it needs to be reformed. There are other standards that we expect our methods to meet beyond mere reliability, especially standards of practical rationality, which are too often forgotten in metaphilosophical discussions that tend to focus exclusively on epistemological considerations. Methodological considerations, after all, are not just matters of epistemic normativity, but practical rationality as well. What’s more, considerations of practical rationality become particularly important when we move from the kind of extreme scepticism that Machery endorses to the kind of progressive reformation that we think should be pursued. And so we conclude by arguing that thinking about philosophical inquiry in terms of standards of practical rationality allows us both to better understand what kinds of problems recent empirical work on philosophical cognition raises for the method of cases and also how that work can point the way to reforming it. (shrink)

This essay provides a queer reading of Édouard Glissant’s critique of Western metaphysics as presented in his 1990 work Poetics of Relation. Glissant’s text is interpreted as offering conceptual tools for understanding the production of an outside of the gender binary, as well as for a critique of the naturalisation of the bourgeois framework underlying queer visibility and inclusion as political ends. Based on the self-transgressive character shared by the notions of Relation and queerness, it is further argued that (...) both the potentialities and the aporetic elements of Glissant’s proposal can elucidate those of queer theories and practices. (shrink)

L’auteur, qui se propose de publier, pour le bicentenaire de la naissance d’Édouard Reuss , sa correspondance avec Michel Nicolas , présente l’état de ces lettres inédites et les circonstances de leur rédaction. Il montre qu’elles éclairent l’élaboration de la production littéraire des deux protagonistes et l’évolution de la théologie protestante au XIX e siècle en France. Pour illustrer le combat commun des deux correspondants pour le progrès des sciences théologiques en France, il présente enfin les passages qui concernent (...) le projet de création d’une revue scientifique. Il suggère au passage l’influence insoupçonnée de M. Nicolas sur la théologie protestante française, en particulier sur l’évolution des sciences bibliques. The author, who proposes to publish, for the bicentennial of Edouard Reuss’ birth , his correspondence with Michel Nicolas , presents the state of these yet unpublished letters and the circumstances in which they were written. He shows that they enlighten the literary production of both protagonists and the evolution of French Protestant theology in the 19th century. To illustrate their common struggle for the advance of theological sciences in France, he presents at last passages which concern the project to create a scientific periodical. He also suggests the unsuspected influence of M. Nicolas on French Protestant theology, in particular on the evolution of biblical sciences. (shrink)

In his two volumes on Intuitive Thought Professor Edouard Le Roy continues his idealistic interpretation of spiritual creativity, and turns from its ‘products’ manifested in biological and human evolution to consider its most intimate character, as it is ‘lived through’ or directly experienced in intuitive and inventive thinking. The whole plan and its execution are determined by two characteristic themes of Bergsonism—intuition and the dynamical schema—though these are repensès in a quite original way. “Intuitive thought” and “metaphysical thought,” M. Le (...) Roy affirms in the preface, are “one and the same”; the latter is condemned only by those who misconceive the former. So by correcting misunderstandings he seeks to. (shrink)

No trait is more characteristic of contemporary philosophy in France than its continued fecundation by the physical and biological sciences. The divorce between philosophy and science that existed in the first half of last century is now regarded, by almost common consent, as an error of the great pre-war Unenlightenment. The ménage is rémonté ; the vieilles traditions of Descartes and Pascal live again, though very transfigured. How long the alliance may endure, how and how much it may benefit both (...) parties, it would be idle to prophesy. But it is significant that Boutroux and Bergson were compelled to devote much energy to acquiring a scientific competence, the one in mechanics, the other in biology. It is still more significant that a number of professional scientists should, with the passing of years, have contributed less to their sciences and increasingly to philosophy. This mutual invasion of territories has, indeed, become so considerable and enduring that philosophy in France is at present, for good or ill, almost wholly ‘philosophy of the sciences.’ It is now within this ‘internationalized’ neutral zone that the distinction between the epistemological and the ontological has to be drawn. Thus, Meyerson fairly represents the former emphasis, Bergson and Le Roy the latter. And if it is rare for one man to hold successively a chair in mathematics and a chair in philosophy, like Milhaud and Whitehead, rarer still is it for one man to hold both concurrently. But M. Edouard Le Roy has for many years lectured on mathematics and mechanics at the Faculte des Sciences in Paris; he has extended and modified Bergsonism from Bergson's former chair at the College de France. (shrink)

In this paper, we report the results of three high-powered replication studies in experimental philosophy, which bear on an alleged instability of folk philosophical intuitions: the purported susceptibility of epistemic intuitions about the Truetemp case (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge. Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) to order effects. Evidence for this susceptibility was first reported by Swain et al. (Philos Phenomenol Res 76(1):138–155, 2008); further evidence was then found in two studies by Wright (Cognition 115(3):491–503, 2010) and Weinberg et al. (Monist 95(2):200–222, (...) 2012). These empirical results have been quite influential in the recent metaphilosophical debate about the method of cases. However, none of Swain et al.’s ( 2008 ) predictions concerning order effects with Truetemp cases could be consistently and robustly replicated in our three experiments, and it is thus at best unclear whether Truetemp intuitions are in fact unstable. So, if proponents of the negative program in experimental philosophy still want to use order effects to challenge the reliability of philosophical case judgments, they would be well advised to look elsewhere instead. In any case, given the more robust empirical evidence that we present in this paper, the metaphilosophical flurry created by Swain et al. ( 2008 ) and Wright’s ( 2010 ) influential studies looks like mere alarmism in hindsight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Changes in CharacterSeth Robertson (bio)I expect that many readers and most reviewers of John M. Doris’ Character Trouble will find tempting some quip about how the book counterexamples itself. After all, it puts on display a remarkable consistency of character, spanning over 20 years, from Doris. Virtue ethics and virtue theory have undergone substantial evolution, psychology is (according to some) undergoing a revolution, and, through it all, Doris’ skepticism (...) about moral character has remained steadfast. I hope that, should this temptation arise, it would be followed quickly by the thought that such quips evince a misunderstanding of Doris’ view. After all, entrenched skepticism about moral character (or moral character theorized a certain way) would be exactly the kind of narrow trait that has not overly worried Doris.In fact, one of the most helpful aspects of the book is that it makes it more difficult to misunderstand or dismiss Doris’ views. I’ll have more to say about this shortly, but first I should mention that my main goal here is not to write a general or detailed review of Character Trouble, but instead to write [End Page 541] a review aimed primarily at an audience of those interested in the intersection of moral psychology, moral character, and comparative or cross-cultural moral philosophy. Moral character has received much attention in cross-cultural philosophy both broadly (for example, Gyeke 1995; Bewaji 2004; Singh 2021; Hanner 2021; Cokelet 2016; Kim 2016; Sim 2015; Van Norden 2003, 2002; Sarkissian 2010; Wong 2015), and specifically regarding the situationist critique of virtue ethics (Hutton 2006; Slingerland 2011; Mower 2013; Robertson 2018), and these topics continue to attract interest.1 And they do so with good reason: accounts of, and ideas about, moral psychology and moral character from outside the Western philosophical canon are both fascinating in and of themselves and also immensely philosophically valuable for refining our understanding of what human morality and ethics could and should be.For scholars interested in these cross-cultural projects, Character Trouble is incredibly helpful. Doris has long maintained that certain non-Western ways of thinking about human moral psychology may be less susceptible to some of the concerns he raises (Doris 2022, p. 40). Even if one disagrees (or disagrees heartily) with some of the conclusions Doris draws, his questions are consistently excellent ones, especially for those trying to develop interpretations of historical works without inadvertently or unknowingly importing contentious assumptions about human moral psychology. Doris’ “Lotta-Little Principle,” which underlies a great deal of his argumentation throughout the anthology, is especially valuable for those working in cross-cultural philosophy. It states, “typically, many factors are implicated in complex psychological outcomes, and relatively seldom are individual factors implicated especially strongly” (p. 172; see pp. 172–173). Beyond simply being true, the principle is an incredibly helpful guide for doing good, rich, non-overly reductive moral philosophy. Saliently for this discussion, adherence to the Lotta-Little Principle also should incentivize doing (or supporting) more cross-cultural moral philosophy because (a) oftentimes, moral philosophy outside the Western canon adheres or adheres relatively more to the Lotta-Little Principle, and (b) if our aim is to better notice and appreciate moral psychological complexity, one of the obvious places to start, should we wish to do so well, is cross-cultural moral philosophy (to better ensure that our assumptions and intuitions about moral psychology aren’t simply parochial).Character Trouble contains 11 essays and an appendix, including the classic “Persons, Situations, and Character” (1998), and two new essays, “Making Good” and “The Future of Character.” The appendix (“An Open Letter to Our Students,” co-written with Edouard Machery) contains a great deal of helpful advice that any graduate student interested in ethics would benefit from reading. Around half of the essays focus on issues at the intersection of moral psychology and moral responsibility and agency, topics that, despite receiving serious attention in cross-cultural philosophy (e.g., [End Page 542] Seok 2017; Finnigan 2022; Sommers 2012), deserve much more: mainstream discussions of agency and responsibility stand to benefit a great deal from a richer understanding of how intuitions, attitudes, and ways of theorizing about culpability, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, and related... (shrink)

In his two volumes on Intuitive Thought Professor Edouard Le Roy continues his idealistic interpretation of spiritual creativity, and turns from its ‘products’ manifested in biological and human evolution to consider its most intimate character, as it is ‘lived through’ or directly experienced in intuitive and inventive thinking. The whole plan and its execution are determined by two characteristic themes of Bergsonism—intuition and the dynamical schema—though these are repensès in a quite original way. “Intuitive thought” and “metaphysical thought,” M. Le (...) Roy affirms in the preface, are “one and the same”; the latter is condemned only by those who misconceive the former. So by correcting misunderstandings he seeks to. (shrink)

Recent advances in wireless technologies have led to the development of intelligent, in-vehicle safety applications designed to share information about the actions of nearby vehicles, potential road hazards, and ultimately predict dangerous scenarios or imminent collisions. These vehicle safety communication (VSC) technologies rely on the creation of autonomous, self-organizing, wireless communication networks connecting vehicles with roadside infrastructure and with each other. As the technical standards and communication protocols for VSC technologies are still being developed, certain ethical implications of these new (...) information technologies emerge: Coupled with the predicted safety benefits of VSC applications is a potential rise in the ability to surveil a driver engaging in her everyday activities on the public roads. This paper will explore how the introduction of VSC technologies might disrupt the “contextual integrity” of personal information flows in the context of highway travel and threaten one’s “privacy in public.” Since VSC technologies and their related protocols and standards are still in the developmental stage, the paper will conclude by revealing how close attention to the ethical implications of the remaining design decisions can inform and guide designers of VSC technologies to create innovate safety applications that increase public safety, but without compromising the value of one’s privacy in public. (shrink)

This essay comments on the articles by Loretta M. Kopelman and Anita Silvers. It extends their analyses and concludes that consistency and the total absence of conflict may be unavailable when one interprets and applies the Americans with Disabilities Act.